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1.　Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide a summary and brief discussion of 
The Puritan Gift: Triumph, Colapse and Revival of an American Dream (2007). 
Writen by Kenneth and Wiliam Hopper, brothers, the book folows the patern 
of Shirer’s The Rise and Fal of the Third Reich chronicling how American 
management developed into such a special skil set whose practice brought 
about many successful companies up to the 1970s and then went into decline. 
The paper is organized as folows:
1.　Introduction
2.　Summary of the book
a.　Part I: Origins
b.　Part I: Rise
c.　Part II: Triumph
d.　Part IV: Colapse – The Cult of the (So-caled) Expert
e.　Part V: Revival
3.　Discussion of the book
The book consists of 19 chapters divided among the five parts listed above. It 
was published in 2007 and brings together the experiences of the Hopper 
brothers: Ken’s in the practice of management in a manufacturing seting and 
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Wiliam’s as a “linguist by training and investment banker by profession.”1) The 
book also benefits from the authors’ association with such legendary 
management professionals as Peter Drucker and, of quality management fame, 
W. Edwards Deming.
In short, the book, probably for the first time, describes how good American 
management came about and flourished during the period from 1870 to 1970, 
faling into decline since that time. It had its origins in the Puritan genius and 
work ethic embodied in the successful founding of the Massachusets Bay 
Colony. Based on this way of thinking, American management gradualy 
became more “sophisticated” (in a good way) through the contributions ofered 
by several notables, described as they appear chronologicaly in history. In the 
authors’ view American management was perhaps at its zenith around 1950 
when a few dedicated Americans on General MacArthur’s occupation staff 
shared its fundamentals with the Japanese. So here, step-by-step is, in the 
Hoppers’ view, the rise and fal of American management.
Note: Al quotes are from the book even if there is no page citation given.
2.　Summary of the Book
a.　Part I: Origins
Chapter 1: The Puritan Origins of American Managerial Culture. According 
to Wikipedia, the Puritans were a significant grouping of English-speaking 
Protestants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. And, according to the 
Hoppers, when a group of them migrated to America in 1630 they brought with 
them four characteristics which proved to be a gift to not only American 
management but also to American society:
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 1)　Kenneth credits Wiliam with doing most of the writing and expanding the scope of 
the book to cover “al aspects of business [versus factory management only], 
government and even, to some extent, the structure of society itself” (p. xi).
• A belief that life’s purpose is to establish the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth.
• An aptitude for mechanical skils.
• A belief that individual interests should be subordinated for the common 
good.
• An ability to marshal resources for a single purpose and the common good.
It was these characteristics that led to the successful establishment of the 
Massachusets Bay Colony that was led by John Winthrop and played such an 
important role in America’s eventual founding as a nation. These four things, 
working together, are at the heart of America’s managerial system.
Here are some of the examples the authors provide to show how these four 
characteristics were so much a part of the American way of thinking:
• The astute French writer Alexis de Tocquevile saw New England’s 
civilization in 1835 as “a beacon lit upon mountain tops” that goes out to 
make al the country beter (first characteristic).
• Ben Franklin and his many inventions (second characteristic).
• John Winthrop’s “city on the hil” sermon (1630) (the third characteristic).
• The Winthrop expedition to America that went so wel due to the 
excelence of its planning/execution (the fourth characteristic).
Chapter 2: The Great Migration of the 1630s. This was the Puritan migration 
led by John Winthrop to form the Massachusets Bay Colony. This migration, 
along with a few others,2) essentialy established the Puritan work and 
managerial culture within American society. Benefiting from the mistakes of the 
past disastrous colonization efforts at Jamestown and Plymouth, this group 
carefuly planned and carried out the migration. The reasons for its success can 
be prety much summed up in the four characteristics mentioned above. Besides 
the profit motive they were truly interested in making a beter society; i.e., 
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 2)　They cite the Wiliam Penn colonization of Pennsylvania in the 1680s.
“creating God’s kingdom on Earth.” They also made sure they had the skils 
(including “mechanical”) that would be needed, were wiling to sacrifice 
individual interests for the good of the whole, and demonstrated a remarkable 
ability for efectively marshaling the resources for such a major undertaking.
This later item also ilustrates an important feature of good management the 
authors cal “integrated decision-making” whereby those who plan a project are 
also responsible for its execution. This was just the opposite of traditional 
practice in Europe then where the planning of a project was handled by one 
group and its execution by another. Another characteristic of integrated decision-
making is that plenty of time is devoted to planning which then alows the 
execution to be swiftly carried out. This was ilustrated with the 1630 Puritan 
migration by the sailing taking place only six months after the final decision 
was made.
Chapter 3: “Westward the Course of Empire Takes its Way.” Although the 
Puritan “outlook” spread throughout America in many ways, the authors cite 
two in particular: the Shakers and the Mormons. Although the Shaker movement 
went into decline folowing the Civil War, their possession of the four classical 
Puritan characteristics decidedly contributed to their spread. Even more so was 
the Mormon migration in 1846 led by Brigham Young that went from Ilinois to 
what would be Utah. Again we see this idea of establishing “God’s kingdom on 
Earth” (making a beter society), exceling in mechanical abilities, encouraging 
everyone to help perfect the society as a whole, and the ability to plan and carry 
out the efective use of resources as the migration itself ably demonstrated.
Chapter 4: The Profound Influence of French Technology. One indication of 
how French technology influenced American management was the part two men 
played in the establishment of West Point, a school that would have a profound 
impact on the application of technology to not only the military but to the 
civilian world as wel. The first was one Louis de Tousard whose proposal 
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entitled Formation of a School of Artilerists and Engineers is “now generaly 
thought of as a blueprint for the future West Point.”
The other was Sylvanus Thayer who held the position of superintendent of 
West Point for twenty-four years. Although a New Englander, Thayer obviously 
was an admirer of French technology having brought back French textbooks on 
engineering from there for use at West Point. Thayer’s influence on technology 
continued with the founding of the Thayer School of Engineering in 1867.
A couple of other examples are given to demonstrate the French influence. 
The first is General Jean-Baptiste de Gribeauval who, in 1785, impressed 
Thomas Jefferson—then in Paris as an American minister—with the 
interchangeability of musket parts (in this case the lock). The other example, 
and perhaps one of the best, was the founding of DuPont by the French 
immigrant of the same name (Eleuthere Irenee du Pont de Nemours) in 1804. 
This company distinguished itself in those days by its quality of manufacture of 
black powder in that it exploded only when you wanted it to (as opposed to that 
produced by others).
The question is raised as to why America was more inclined to accept 
technology than Britain; the authors suggest it was due to America’s early 
promotion of universal education and the Puritan view of always seeking ways 
to do things beter.
In any event, this adopted French appreciation of technology and for the 
technologist was to prove to be an important fifth element—besides the four 
Puritan characteristics imported from Britain—that made American management 
unique and superior.
b.　Part II: Rise
Chapter 5: Colonel Roswel Lee Designs the Prototype. At this point the 
authors begin discussing the rise of American management, and do so in terms 
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of specific companies and persons that contributed to that rise—the first being 
the Springfield (Massachusets) Armory as run by one Colonel Roswel Lee 
from 1815 until 1833 (when he died). There were two areas in which the 
Springfield Armory proved to be far ahead of its time: modern management 
methods and the move from manufacturing based on craftsmanship to the use of 
machine tools.
Managerialy, some of the things that distinguished Lee’s company and were 
to be adopted by future great American companies3) were line-of-command,4) a 
line-and-staff structure, delegation of decision-making to the lowest level 
capable, and concern for the welfare of its employees. Lee’s company also had a 
managerial hierarchy, something mostly foreign to companies in those days (the 
example they cite is the textile industry, then the dominate one).
Another major change that was occurring in those days, and was practiced by 
the Springfield Armory, was the move from craftsmanship to mass production 
made possible by the introduction of machine tools and the interchangeability of 
parts. And with this change came the need for a more educated worker who 
could operate and maintain the more complicated machinery. Accordingly, the 
authors believe the reason the move to mass production succeeded in America 
more than in Britain was beter education. This meant the common workman 
was beter equipped to handle the new machinery and, for that mater, solve 
problems as they arose. It was also easier to find good candidates for 
management positions.
It was around this time that American management practices, combined with 
the use of machine tools and accurate gauges, began to surpass those of Britain. 
That this was the case became obvious with the Great Exhibit of 1851 in 
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 3)　Referred to by the authors as the “Great Engine Companies” (and herein 
abbreviated GECs).
 4)　Usualy refered to as “chain-of-command.”
London where, much to the surprise of the British, the American products 
displayed were superior to theirs. Especialy impressive were Colt’s revolving 
pistol, Singer’s sewing machine, and McCormick’s mechanical reaper.
The idea of having interchangeable parts had great significance for 
manufacturing and, indeed, for society in general. The authors cite three things 
that resulted: inventories of spare parts making it easy to repair the many 
machines then coming into use, mass production, since many parts could now 
be made for quick assembly into a final product, and, given the ability to mass 
produce, mass markets became possible. Al this meant that society could begin 
enjoying more products of higher quality at less cost. As First Industrial 
Revolution was British, this was to be the Second Industrial Revolution and was 
distinctly American.
Chapter 6: Dan McCalum Creates the Multidivisional Corporation. The next 
major development was when the management ideas of the Springfield Armory, 
which had only one “division,” were applied to a multidivisional company. This 
occurred with the appointment of Daniel McCalum in 1854 as General 
Superintendent of the then accident-prone New York and Erie Railroad (the 
“Erie”). McCalum had already proven his worth as the superintendent of one of 
its divisions.
McCalum made many contributions to improve the railroad’s management 
such as measuring individual performance, cost accounting, and beter 
information flow. However it was his development of a wel functioning line-of-
command and supporting staf (the doctrine of “line-and-staf”) as applied to 
multiple divisions that was the most important. Under McCalum’s system there 
was a clear line of authority from the general superintendent down through the 
geographical superintendents to those actualy handling the trafic. There was 
also a supporting staff that overlay the geographical divisions. McCalum’s 
Achiles’ heel was his overly authoritarian ways, which led to his leaving the 
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company in 1857.
Fortunately, McCalum’s ideas were not to die with his forced resignation. A 
friend and admirer, Henry Poor, was the editor of the American Railroad 
Journal, “the leading business periodical of ante-belum America.” Poor’s close 
observations of how the Erie had dramaticaly changed under McCalum were 
wel publicized in his editorials. Taken together, the authors believe these 
“constitute one of the most important treatises on management ever published in 
America—or indeed anywhere” (p. 70). The overly authoritarian weakness 
in McCallum’s approach to management was also recognized in Poor’s 
editorials.
Another person who was instrumental in not only promoting McCalum’s 
ideas but also puting them to use was J. Edgar Thompson, the president of the 
very successful Pennsylvania Railroad (the “Pennsy”). With some “important 
variations” he introduced McCalum’s practices for the Pennsy and, using many 
of McCalum’s “words and phrases,” published an organizational manual in 
1857. The company would also formaly publish the doctrine of “line-and-staf” 
in 1859. So it can be seen how the ideas and practices of Lee and McCalum are 
gradualy becoming explicit parts of American management.
The Pennsy became a shinning example of good corporate management and 
served a model for such important companies as Swift & Co. (meatpacking) and 
Carnegie (steel)—companies with product-centered (vs. geographical) divisions. 
In fact, Carnegie was a very successful executive with the Pennsy before turning 
to the steel business and, no doubt, brought many of the management ideas he 
learned there with him.
And as American management developed and became more effective it 
continued to cause significant improvements in American life. For example its 
contribution to the success of the railroad industry in turn meant “mass-
distribution” became possible at just about the time mass-production was 
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coming on line.
Chapter 7: Frederick W. Taylor Reorganizes the Factory Floor. Taylor lived 
from 1856 until 1915 but in those 59 years had a great influence on American 
management. Although Taylor’s idea of improving productivity was a good one, 
his “scientific” approach to this was not since it was based on “contempt for the 
ordinary working man.” It did resonate somewhat with the first Puritan 
characteristic—creating the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, with its “religious” 
undertones—and definitely with the second characteristic of mechanical skil 
ability with its emphasis on improving work methods. However, Taylor himself 
“scored zero” on the other two: subordinating individual interests for the good 
of the whole and organizational and marshaling skils—he was an egomaniac 
and totaly incompetent as a manager.
Taylor’s view of the worker as merely a person who was to respond to 
directions from above versus doing any thinking on his own led to a hostile 
worker/management relationship and a rise in labor union power. Fortunately at 
about this same time, known as the Progressive Era, other changes to the 
workplace were making it more humane in terms of how workers were 
treated—e.g., anti-trust and food-safety laws. Others who sort of came to the 
rescue were Alan Mogensen, who believed the workers themselves were in the 
best position to know how to improve the work methods, and Frank and Lilian 
Gilbreth with their emphasis on improving work methods versus making the 
workers work harder (as Taylorism stressed).
As wil be discussed later in the book, with the rise of the management 
consultant and the MBA in the twentieth century, there wil be a return to 
puting the worker in second place in the sense that upper management knows 
best with its emphasis on short-term profits.
Chapter 8: Pierre du Pont Invents the Modern Manufacturing Company. 
Given his religiosity, mechanical skils (in chemicals), interests in others, and 
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excelent organizational abilities, du Pont was the embodiment of the four 
Puritan characteristics. He also had a great interest in technology.
Under du Pont’s leadership,5) the Dupont company became the model for the 
“Great Engine Companies (GECs)” that were to folow such as General Motors 
and General Electric. He set up divisions and, to develop the strategy for the 
entire company, an executive commitee. Although the commitee was not to 
meddle in divisional affairs, they were very familiar with the divisions since 
most were either present or past divisional presidents—a significant diference 
from today’s typical board of “outsiders” who are more concerned with the 
stockholders and finances, and dealing with divisions as if they were 
commodities.
Other du Pont innovations that were to characterize the GECs included 
vertical integration, bringing in non-family members to the executive commitee 
(to get their ideas), and seting up a research facility that operated on the basis 
of not requiring immediate results as is more the norm today—the later 
resulting in such inventions as nylon and neoprene.
c.　Part III: Triumph
Chapter 9: The Golden Age of American Management (1920–1970). With the 
groundwork laid by such as Lee, McCalum, and du Pont, the age of the Great 
Engine Companies (GECs) and, indeed the golden age of American 
management, came about in 1920 and lasted for fifty years. Its demise was 
caused by what the authors cal the “cult of the (so caled) experts.”
Besides things already mentioned such as “line and staf,” an emphasis on 
research, and respect for the ideas of the working man (botom-up 
management), the authors discuss several other atributes of the GECs. First they 
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 5)　He became president in 1903.
exemplified the four Puritan characteristics already much discussed in the book 
and, hence, its title. They also had a respect for technology as inherited from the 
French. Here are other atributes:
• Leaders (CEO, president, senior executives) who have worked their way up 
the organization and thus were wel versed in its products and operations. 
Related to this was the idea of “universal promotability” meaning anyone, 
even those at the lowest levels, had a chance to rise to these top positions.
• Within the company “administrative coordination” replaced “market 
coordination”6) meaning the company was focused on stability and long-
term growth versus short-term profits—something that reversed itself 
with the coming of the (so caled) experts.
• They were eficient organizations, perhaps owing to the groundwork laid 
by people like Lee, McCalum and du Pont. Furthermore their “flexibility” 
was proved; for example in World War II “they” able to quickly come up 
with an aircraft able to change the balance of power vis-à-vis the Japanese.
• However according to the authors “the essence” of American management 
at this time is best described by the term “botom-up.” This was the theme 
of a book by Wiliam Givens: Botom-up Management: People Working 
Together (1949). In a nutshel, the idea was encouraging initiative at the 
lowest levels in the organization. As expressed by the authors, it:
…went far beyond the systematic delegation of authority that was 
normal and, indeed, inevitable in any wel-run hierarchy; it implied 
that each manager was in the habit of passing some of his own 
responsibility for decision-making down he chain of command to the 
lowest level ready, wiling and able to accept it. (p. 103)
Botom-up management was based on a mutual trust between management 
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 6)　A point made by Alfred Chandler in his book The Visible Hand: The Management 
Revolution in American Business. (1977).
and those managed that each wil do his/her part—management backing up 
those managed and providing guidance when necessary, those managed 
doing their best to show and wisely use the initiative vested in them.
Despite the travails of the Great Depression, most of the GECs survived, 
probably mainly due to folowing the Puritan idea of trying to avoid debt as 
much as possible. In fact, this was a time of great technological progress for the 
GECs—think of things like radio, electricity, flying, etc.
The authors note that Peter Drucker, in his Practice of Management (1954) 
mentions the lack of writing and thinking about management at that time and 
this is one of the reasons for this book. The appendix of the book sums up the 
“managerial culture” of the GECs by listing 25 principles which, taken together, 
represent how they operated.7) They note that the dificult part of managing was 
(and is) balancing these principles.
In concluding this chapter the authors mention how this “golden age of 
American management” met its demise at the hands of the (so caled) experts 
(discussed in much detail later) and how its ideas spread to Japan after World 
War I (discussed in the next chapter).
Chapter 10: Three Wise Men from the West Go to Japan. The three wise men 
were Homer Sarasohn, Charles Protzman, and Frank Polkinghorn, civilian 
communications engineers who were part of MacArthur’s occupation force 
headquarters. The three were responsible for teaching the Japanese American 
management methods. By that time American management, based on the four 
Puritan characteristics already much discussed in the book, had reached its 
zenith as an efective methodology.
But why “communications” engineers? Because to efectively carry out the 
goal of the occupation of quickly bringing about an independent and democratic 
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 7)　These principles have been reproduced with permission in Appendix A.
Japan, a good public communications system would be needed. The status of the 
existing system at the time is vividly described on page 110 of the book:
…telephones, telegraph and radio stations scarcely functioned. There were 
very few radio sets in the hands of the public. Most central and switching 
telephone and telegraph systems, as wel as the interconnecting lines, had 
been destroyed by bombing; what remained as mostly unusable, due to 
neglect both before and during the war.
To meet this need a Civil Communications Section (CCS) was establish 
within the occupation headquarters and manned by communications engineers 
on loan from America.
To make a long story short, the “three wise men,” wel versed in 
contemporary good management, found a most receptive audience in the 
Japanese managers within the communications equipment-manufacturing 
industry on whom the rebuilding of the system would rely.8) Before that system 
could be rebuilt a viable manufacturing capability would have to be established. 
The three wise men did their job with such obvious zeal and unselfishness that 
their pupils were highly motivated to learn and apply what they were taught.
In a nutshel this is what the Japanese managers were taught: good Scientific 
Management (manufacturing procedures), good management structuring (e.g., 
creating a staf to relieve the line personnel), and the principles of botom-up 
management applied within a Japanese context.
As the saying goes, the rest is history. Given the ideas of good American 
management the industrious Japanese “ran with it” and, in a relatively short 
time, these ideas spread throughout other industries (think Toyota and Honda) 
and Japan became (and remains) an economy second only to the U.S. It is 
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 8)　According to the book Japanese manufacturers would be required since the U.S. 
Congress had “refused to meet the cost of buying and exporting American-made 
capital goods” (p. 110)
interesting to note that about this time the quality movement was taking of and 
incorporated many of the same ideas that the three wise men taught.
d.　Part IV: Colapse – The Cult of the (So-caled) Expert
Chapter 11: Origins and Nature of the Cult. In discussing the origins of the 
cult the authors return to the influence Fredrick Taylor had on management. 
Taylor rightly recognized the problem of the overburdened foreman who in 
most companies was responsible for not only the production process but also 
almost everything else such as accounting and personnel management. It was 
around this time (1900) that the use of a staf (originating with people like Lee 
and McCalum) to solve this problem was coming on line. However, Taylor’s 
solution was to create multiple positions filed with “experts.” As the authors 
state in the book:
…the general foreman would be replaced by eight “functional foremen or 
bosses”…
…some of these names are in the plural—so [Taylor] was realy talking 
about many more than eight men replacing one. Taylor also sought to abolish 
the general manager (roughly today’s chief executive); he was to be replaced 
by “a planning department” consisting of [some of the] functional foremen 
listed above, acting colectively, the actual number of persons again not being 
specified. (p. 130)
The net result as so wel stated by the authors was to emphasize al the more 
“the need for ‘generalist’ managers to pul the threads back together again” and 
be in charge—with such a difusion of responsibility no one would be!
And so as the traditional line-and-staf structural arrangement became a part 
of the modus operandi of the GECs, there was stil this underlying influence of 
Taylor on management thinking which was to reassert itself in the later part of 
the twentieth century as neo-Taylorism. The authors cite the five atributes of an 
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organization that is based on neo-Taylorism:
• It is run based on measurements and the resulting numbers. This often leads 
to falsifying the numbers or “manipulating the events underlying them.”
• Credentials are the way to identify the (management) “Expert.”
• The modus operandi is one of “top down” management since those 
below can’t possibly know anything of significance.
• Responsibility is difused among several (many?) “Experts” so al can get 
credit when things go wel and no one wil be blamed when things don’t 
go wel—no accountability!
• Problems are “solved” by appointing an “Expert” to be responsible for it 
and launching an “initiative” to make a show of handling the mater, al 
separate from the line-of-command. Al this without realy defining the 
problem or the resources needed to solve it. This is the exact opposite of 
“integrated decision-making” described above where there is careful 
planning and those responsible for the planning are also responsible (read 
“accountable”) for the execution.
This new way of managing embraced these characteristics also:
• Internaly “market coordination” replaced “administrative coordination” 
whereby short-term profits over long-term growth and stability became 
the norm and a spirit of internal competition replaced that of cooperation.
• A failure to give due atention to the important qualitative aspects of a 
business such as employee experience, morale, honesty, etc.—things that 
can’t be precisely measured, or even measured at al.
• The overemphasis on “building brands” versus concentrating on the 
quality of the product and service.
• An overreaching human resources department with its ideas on how to 
“fast-track” potentialy good managers using psychometrics (versus the 
GEC idea of good managers rising through the ranks and gaining a solid 
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understanding of the business first).
• And finaly the improper and excessive use of outsourcing to solve 
“problems.” that the company is too lazy to take on itself. This often 
resulted in the loss of control over key activities.
These new ways of thinking reflect the undue influence of certain staff 
positions—such as the accountant, salesman, and personnel manager—giving 
them the authority and influence of a line manager. This trend can be traced 
back to Taylor’s idea of using multiple “functional foremen” to relieve the 
burden on the foreman.
Chapter 12: The Impact of the Cult on the Great Engine Companies. In this 
chapter the Hopper brothers get down to cases showing how the “cult of 
experts” often had a devastating efect on many American companies. In general 
the impact of the cult was two-fold: (1) the replacement of the idea of colective 
leadership with the “imperious CEO” and (2) organizations biased less to 
providing good goods and services and more on meeting short-term financial 
targets.
People like Lee Raymond of Exxon Mobil, Frederick Donner of GM, and 
Ralph Cordiner of GE are cited as examples of the “imperious CEO.” As for the 
idea of puting profit before quality, they draw on Maryann Keler’s The Rise, 
Fal, and Struggle for Recovery of GM (1989) to show how GM either 
manipulated the numbers or events underlying the numbers—just to “meet the 
numbers.” And even such popular programs as Six Sigma and the Balanced 
Scorecard are cited as examples of giving too much emphasis to showing “good 
numbers” versus concentrating on traditional management practices that 
emphasize serving the customer with quality products and services.
Returning to the idea of the “imperious CEO” the authors now mention 
several companies they feel went from good “botom-up” management to “top-
down”:
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• Xerox when Peter McColough replaced Joe Wilson in 1968.
• AT&T when it established a formal marketing department in 1973 
alowing the marketers and accountants to “take over.”
• Coca-Cola with its takeover by Roberto Goizueta in 1981.
• IBM with Lou Gerstner’s decisions to “meet the numbers” through 
manipulation and drastic cost-cuting measures.
• Other organizations mentioned as sufering from the lack of good botom-
up management are Boeing, Fannie Mae, and Merck.
As these marketing/finance types with litle general knowledge of the 
business they were in charge of were taking over, a new type of person began to 
appear to “help” them: the “management consultant.” Although originaly meant 
to be an advisor, the management consultant became ever more influential. As 
the authors put it: “Theoreticaly speaking they were only advisors but no 
company was going to pay milions of dolars for advice and then lightly 
disregard it.” It was this intimate connection between the overly influential 
consultant and the organization that opened the door to many of the scandals 
that occurred in the early 2000’s—for example “Enron, World-Com, Kmart, 
Swissair, Global Crossing” among many others.
The authors use the analogy of puting ice cream on hot apple pie to describe 
how the rise of the “financialy oriented consultants and managers” in the last 
part of the twentieth century brought about a reversal of the traditional qualities 
of the GECs based on Puritan characteristics: “The treatment did not destroy the 
fruit [apple] but it would profoundly afect both its taste and texture” (p. 160).
The chapter concludes by discussing NASA as an example of how the “cult” 
can also afect civil government. NASA’s amazing success with the moon shot 
in July 1969 was due to just plain good American management as practiced by 
the GECs. After that things seemed to go down hil with the Chalenger disaster 
in 1986 and the Columbia disaster in 2003. With the loss of people like James 
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Webb who led NASA from 1961 to 1968, the culture seemed to change from 
one where you have a hands-on, wel-rounded chief executive who, working 
with his coleagues, makes the big decisions and accepts responsibility to just 
the opposite.
In summing up the authors quote the last of Donald Keough’s9) “Ten 
Commandments for Losing”—one Keough believes wil guarantee losing: 
“Make sure you do not make a move until you have consulted half a dozen 
business school professors” (p. 163). This sets the stage for the next chapter, 
which discusses the role played by business schools in creating and sustaining 
the cult.
Chapter 13: The Business Schools as Temples of the Cult. Although the 
“business school” came into existence in 1908 with the founding of Harvard, it 
was not until the later part of the twentieth century that its impact on 
management was truly felt. This delay was mostly because of the unpopularity 
of “management” as a career until then. This dramaticaly changed as reported 
by Fortune magazine in March 1993 with the annual output of the schools going 
“from 6,000 in the early 1960s to 77,000 in 1990” (p. 166). It is teling that this 
same reference said that many of these MBA graduates were “‘dreadful 
managers’ and plenty were ‘greedy, lazy or incompetent’.”
The key point here is how did this MBA movement affect the GECs? The 
authors say it was in these four ways:
• First it changed the social composition of senior management so now there 
were two types: the old-timers and the MBAs. Since the later were often 
fast-tracked this resulted in resentment by and demoralization of the former.
• Second the MBA missed out on learning the business from the ground up 
and becoming a “wel-rounded” manager.
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• Third “botom-up” became “top-down.”
• Fourth the new managers looked at things from a profit and loss view 
puting quantitative ahead of qualitative; they had no desire to “go to the 
gemba.”10)
The authors then go on to explain where things went wrong. The basic 
problem is that business schools operate on the assumption their product, the 
“professional manager,” can handle any management job. This flies in the face 
of the fact that to be a good manger you need to (a) learn on-the-job and (b) 
thoroughly know the business—these two being closely related of course. 
Unfortunately things got of to a bad start with the founding of Harvard where 
two schools of thought evolved about what should be taught: a general 
education in business taught by academics versus an education that was 
specialized by industry and mostly taught by practitioners; unfortunately the 
former prevailed. Ironicaly, one reason for the poor start of the business school 
movement was the lack of integrated decision making at Harvard’s inception: 
after the decision to create the school, it was left to others—the successive 
deans—to figure out what the school should actualy be.
In trying to determine what it should be, the B-School, as the Harvard 
business school has come to be known, promoted various “management” ideas 
but three, in the authors’ opinion, stand out: Scientific Management, Human 
Relations, and Stockholder Value. Edwin Gay, Harvard’s first dean, must have 
seen Scientific Management—then coming to the fore—as a “godsend” giving 
him something to offer. In 1919 the reins passed to the second dean, Bret 
Donham, who came up with the idea of dividing up the curriculum according to 
“routine work” and “problem work.” The former—read “manufacturing”— 
considered to not require that much atention by the manager, accordingly got 
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10)　The gemba in Japanese parlance is the place where the work is actualy being done 
such as the factory floor.
less atention by the business schools so that “the B-School’s manufacturing 
department would be alowed to wither way between the [world] wars” (p. 173).
About this time the famous 1927 Hawthorne Experiment by Elton Mayo at a 
Western Electric plant near Chicago took place. In the authors’ opinion the 
outcome of this experiment—itself not good science—“was the vastly over-rated 
and hugely damaging Human Relations Movement” (p. 173). The authors see 
the HR movement as having had two adverse efects on American management: 
(a) a deterioration in shop-floor discipline and (b) the stifling of any serious 
discussion of management-labor relations (since the later had been usurped by 
the largely meaningless “slogans” of the human relations gurus). Ironicaly, had 
these gurus (Fredrick Herzberg11) is mentioned) done more “listening” they 
might have helped American management advance more quickly; as early as the 
1920s some of the GECs were already experimenting with “participative” 
practices.
The third major idea promoted by the B-School was Stockholder Value. This, 
simply put, meant profit over anything else, even serving the customer. The 
Hoppers see this trend as a result of a misinterpretation of Adam Smith’s idea of 
“self-love.” In fact, “…he [Smith] did not think the primary purpose of business 
activity was to earn a profit for the shareholder—rather he believed that its only 
purpose was to satisfy the consumer” (p. 178). That the university would be 
promoting the idea of “profit first” would have “horrified” the Puritan founders 
of Harvard.
The authors go on to show how this “unsound and pernicious” doctrine has 
led to some of the biggest downfals in American business such as the 
bankruptcy of the once-mighty Pennsylvania Railroad in 1970 and the Enron 
debacle in 2001 when Jeffrey Skiling, a 1979 graduate of the B-School, 
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bankrupted the corporation.
In essence the problem with the business school mentality is it sees the 
manager as a “professional” who manages within a framework of “statistical and 
financial terms.” And these things, once learned in the classroom, qualify him or 
her to manage any business. However, to be a good manager it is necessary, in 
the Hoppers’ opinion, to be a generalist with the requisite “domain knowledge” 
about the business he or she is managing. In fact, they contend the theory of 
management is “infinitesimal” (compared with fields like medicine or physics) 
and it is the practice of management that is important. This business school 
“counter-culture” has led to the rejection of the principles of good management 
(see Appendix A) either directly or indirectly.
The chapter concludes by speculating on how the business school should 
change and two ideas are ofered: as a trade school—which they have in a sense 
become for the “financial” industry—or as a school for up and coming 
managers to broaden their knowledge beyond what they’ve learned in their 
respective companies (like a military staf school).
Chapter 14: The Impact of the Cult on Society. The authors contend the “Cult 
of the (So-caled) Expert” had a “direct and negative efect” on America GECs 
and an “indirect and negative efect” on American society. To ilustrate this, in 
this chapter, they give a few examples by, like Jack Horner, puling “a few 
plums out of this pie.” Accordingly they take a look at how “experts” have 
affected American society in these areas (the plums): war, education, capital 
expenditure, economic policy, and medicine.
War. Several examples are given such as Robert McNamara’s Scientific 
Management approach to the Vietnam War; using “body count” and number of 
“secured hamlets” as a measure of our success there. Such criterion led to 
tragedies like the Lt. Caley My Lai incident. In fact the authors believe there 
were probably “scores of My Lais.” The authors see this “measurement” 
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approach as squandering “milions of hours of valuable managerial and non-
managerial time” (p. 195) and, worse yet, it led to wrong decisions and a wrong 
outcome:
The wrong people were promoted. Wrong conclusions were reached. The 
wrong outcome was achieved. Vast numbers of lives (over 50,000 of them 
American) were squandered and Vietnam’s movement to democracy and 
capitalism delayed by thirty years. (p. 193)
Other examples are given such as McGeorge Bundy, serving as head of the 
National Security Council yet lacking the requisite “domain knowledge” for the 
job and Donald Rumsfeld’s inappropriate use of “metrics.”
Education. Thanks to the “experts” the American educational system has 
gone from one of where students were both given knowledge and taught how to 
think, to one that has been dumbed down. Joseph Taylor, district superintendent 
of schools in New York City, ushered in the “Age of Administration” from 
about 1900 on. This turned teaching into a “profession” versus something best 
learned “‘on the job’, under the supervision of an experienced practitioner, as 
teachers did in earlier times” (p. 197). Now one could obtain from the schools 
of education that sprang up “intelectualy worthless paper qualifications of 
considerable commercial value” leading to a secure, relatively wel paying job.
Some of the other “evils” brought on by the cult were meaningless 
measurements of a teacher’s fitness (number of articles published) and a 
school’s goodness (number of PhDs), the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT)— 
which measured “examination technique, not knowledge or inteligence,” 
credentialism and grad inflation, and, in general, a move away from the hard 
sciences by students to “‘soft’ subjects like management, the media, education 
and social sciences” (p. 203).
John Dewey (1859–1952) and his Progressive Education come in for 
particular criticism as a major cause for the dumbing down of education and the 
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effect that’s had on American society. In fact, this need to bring the education 
system back to what it once was “inspired the writing of The Puritan Gift” 
(p. 201).
Capital Expenditure. In looking at this “plum” the authors point out the 
unfortunate impact the “cult” way of thinking had on capital investment. Due to 
the depression of the 1930s (where the problem was over capacity), the needs of 
WW II, and the seler’s market after WW II (along with a lack of foreign 
competition), there had been litle capital investment in the U.S. President 
Kennedy tried to correct this problem with an investment tax credit in 1962. 
However President Johnson, worried about inflation—caused by the Vietnam 
War not overinvestment—and misinformed by his advisors on the actual age of 
America’s industrial equipment, rescinded the Kennedy tax credit in 1969 
sending the message “to the corporate sector: capital investment was bad, so 
stop it” (p. 204).
In a 1970 report Kenneth Hopper (one of the authors) told the truth about 
how misleading the government figures on the age of American equipment were 
and how this was afecting government policy and, in turn, making America less 
competitive vis-à-vis the rest of the industrial world. Although receiving litle 
public atention at first, the report did gain traction by 1971 and government 
thinking was reversed. In August 1971, a new 10 percent investment tax credit 
was announced. However not until 1979 was there ful recognition of the 
problem by the government when the Council of Economic Advisors’ report for 
that year gave “a detail discussion about the benefit that increased capital 
expenditure would bring to the nation…” (p. 207). Unfortunately America was 
already losing the batle with the import of high-quality foreign goods now 
taking away significant market share.12)
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outperform America in the area of quality.
Economic Policy. Here the problem is brought on by the over reliance on 
strictly quantitative measures to assess the state of the American economy. This 
was the result of monetarism which, mainly due to Milton Friedman, came to 
replace Keynesianism as America’s primary economic policy from the early 
1970s until the early 1990s. The authors liken this to the same thing that 
happened to businesses under the influence of Scientific Management where the 
statisticians took over and things were decided on “the numbers” alone—“the 
numbers” in this case being the amount of money in circulation. The problem 
was what measure to use, M0,13) or some broader measure. Also the problem of 
seting targets arose and inevitably…
..the same temptation to “fudge” arose; the authorities would learn to 
massage statistics or even manipulate events so as to sidestep a discipline 
they had imposed upon themselves, just like the “finance guys” at General 
Motors or the US army in Vietnam. (p. 210)
The authors go on to make this very wise comment about the role such 
measures should play in economic policy making:
The answer is to treat them as an invaluable source of evidence to be 
balanced against common sense, logic and also the al-important anecdotal 
knowledge, which is the primary source of information for al human 
beings about the world they live in. (p. 210)
The damage done by such an approach to economic policy making is summed 
up at the end of this section thusly:
Monetary irresponsibility is today matched by fiscal irresponsibility as one 
deficit is plied on another. If present trends continue, one can foresee “the 
US economy folowing the path to extended decline of the British economy 
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13)　Al physical currency in circulation plus central bank accounts that could be 
exchanged for physical curency—the “narowest” definition.
in the 1960s and 1970s and of Japan in the 1990s” (p. 212)14)
How prescient!
Medicine. This final “plum” as an example of how the cult has had a negative 
efect on American society is best ilustrated by how hospital management has 
changed. In the 1860s and 1890s the “Nightingale” model was imported from 
England. In line with what was then happening with businesses, this was a “line-
and-staf” model with the doctors serving as the line and supported by the staf 
consisting of the nurses and those responsible for the finances. In this 
arrangement there was strict accountability. Also, for both doctors and nurses 
their work was more of a “caling” versus a money making “profession.”
Now we see such things such as the “Health Care Executive” with litle 
general knowledge medicine. Also the field of medicine has become a 
“marketplace” where knowledge is sold to the highest bidder—this aspect has 
made senior doctors reluctant to share their hard earned knowledge with their 
juniors and the richest (versus the sickest) people geting treated by the best 
doctors. Furthermore, numerous “specialists” have replaced the “family doctor” 
who could beter understand a patient’s complete situation.
Nursing also has changed. For example, with the outsourcing of much of the 
patient care such as the cleaning and feeding chores, the nurse is no longer 
responsible for the whole person thus often losing touch with the patient’s actual 
condition. Also, as seen in the field of education, there is an overemphasis on 
geting credentials.
For sure, now the patient seems to be taking second place with the teling 
symbol being “a half-eaten, dried-out meal siting for hours by a hospital bed 
occupied by a semi-conscious patient” (p. 216), something Florence Nightingale 
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14)　They are quoting Adam Posen, Senior Felow at the Institute for International 
Economics in Washington, DC from his article “The Economics of a Second Term” 
in the November 9, 2004 Financial Times.
would have abhored.
In addition to the medical specialists there is now a rise in the number of 
other specialists such as “patient advocates” and the use of “disease 
management teams” by health insurance companies.
According to the authors two (surprising—at least to me) statistics support the 
negative effects of this changed field of American medicine: an increase in 
infant mortality rate and a decrease in average height. They also mention the 
fact that “Americans are also sufering from two generations of obesity” (p. 219).
This section concludes by quoting the economist Paul Krugman about the 
way the Veterans Health Administration operates using an integrated system—a 
“system that doesn’t need legions of administrative staff to check patients’ 
coverage and demand payment from their insurance companies” (p. 219 of the 
book). Furthermore, the authors add, with the VHA model “the hierarchical 
structure of the Nightingale Hospital15) survives intact among both doctors and 
nurses, permiting the fast and accurate transmission of information upwards, 
downwards, and sideways, but, above al, upwards” (p. 219).
Chapter 15: The Years the Locust Ate (1971–1995). This chapter begins by 
clearly stating what the authors believe to be the Golden Ages of both American 
Management and American Society and when the “American Dream” for al 
ceased:
• 1920–1970: The Golden Age of American Management.
• 1950–1970: The Golden Age of American Society (mostly during the 
Eisenhower/Kennedy presidencies when the economy flourished).
• 1971–1995: The Years that the Locust Ate and the “American Dream” 
came to an end.
This later period began in the President Johnson years and is characterized 
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by a decline in productivity brought on by a decline in good management. And, 
as the book has been pointing out, that decline was, in turn, brought on by “the 
Cult of the (So Caled) Experts” and their “temples,” the business schools.
This decline in productivity had the immediate effect of less profits for 
employers to share with their workers. It also caused other problems such as a 
slow down in wealth creation, less equal distribution of “rewards” causing many 
at the lower end to get “left behind,” and the cost of key services (e.g., 
education and health care) to increase disproportionately making them 
unavailable to many.
Also contributing to the woes of this period was “reckless borrowing” by the 
government and, encouraged by the government, by the private sector. This, 
combined with such things as more use of fix-interest debt over equity by 
companies, banks no longer retaining responsibility for the whole loan (with the 
derivatives market), and a continued obsession with short-term profits over long-
term growth made maters even worse. The later, obsession with short-term 
profits, was due largely to the rise of institutional investors with their great 
influence on the market.
This atitude toward profit by these institutional investors brought about 
“momentum buying” on a massive scale; i.e., thinking only about what’s doing 
good in the market and buying that (vs. what’s over or under valued). This, in 
turn, led to a self-filing prophecy and eventualy the bubble had to burst leaving 
the last unlucky one “holding the bag.”
It is interesting to note that this “get rich quick” atitude also prevailed in the 
home-credit market and led to the subprime mortgage debacle shortly after this 
book was published. Here the Hoppers were prescient and like the canary in the 
coalmine.
Chapter 16: Dr. Deming Rides to the Rescue—and Fails (1980–1993). The 
situation in American manufacturing was deteriorating in the 1970s to the point 
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where Japan, a country America had soundly defeated 30 years before, was now 
“defeating” America in the market place. In 1980 the National Broadcasting 
Corporation (NBC) aired a documentary If Japan Can, Why Can’t We? As a 
part of this program, Dr. W. Edwards Deming, a man whose ideas had helped 
Japan improve its manufacturing after WW II, spoke about the reason Japan was 
overtaking American markets: beter quality.
Suddenly Deming and his ideas of quality swept across America like a tidal 
wave with companies like Ford Motor Company embracing these ideas to 
improve their product and share of the market. With his upbringing under 
extremely poor conditions and as a devout Episcopalian, Deming was very 
much the embodiment of Puritan ideals being “frugal, diligent and unconcerned 
about the acquisition of wealth” (p. 233). His ideas were eventualy codified in 
his famous 14 Points (see Appendix B) that, in many ways, mirror the Hoppers’ 
25 principles in Appendix A. For example Point Eight: “Drive out fear, so that 
everyone may work effectively for the company” reflects Hoppers’ ideas of 
botom-up management and, as much as possible, a “colegiate” leadership style 
(Principles Four and Five).
Unfortunately Deming’s “rescue” efort failed. For one thing, despite Deming 
preaching the need for management to make the “quality” transformation, 
company boards didn’t necessarily want to be “transformed” from their usual 
ways of thinking and operating. Too often “quality” received only lip service. 
Another problem with Deming’s ideas, according to the authors, was it focused 
too much on just quality without taking into consideration the “many other 
factors, including cost and safety” good managers have work on. Also his 
philosophy failed to discuss the many “structural” issues that are important to 
good management.
Despite these “internal” weaknesses in Deming’s philosophy, it was surely 
superior to a new approach that became popular in the early 1990s: Michael 
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Hammer’s ideas for reengineering the corporation.
Like Deming, [Hammer] believed there was something seriously wrong 
with US business. However, while Deming de facto advocated a return to 
at least some of the traditional American values and practices of the mid-
twentieth century, Hammer blamed industry’s problems on their 
persistence. (p. 239)
Of course this way of thinking not only did harm to the promotion of 
Deming’s ideas but also to any chance of geting back to the Puritan 
characteristics that brought about the Golden Age of American Management.
Chapter 17: The Third (or Sino-Japanese) Industrial Revolution. On top of 
the problem of American management losing its way due to the “short-term 
profit” influence of the business schools and the loss of its Puritan footings, the 
authors see the problem of a third industrial revolution.16) This revolution, now 
taking place, is by Japan and China. It found its origins in Japan and more 
precisely in what the Japanese learned from America during the occupation right 
after WW I (see Chapter 10 summary above).
What the Japanese learned was good management, particularly the idea of 
“botom-up” management that the Japanese adapted to their culture.17) Another 
distinguishing feature of this revolution was the use of electronics (automation) 
in manufacturing. This also found its origins in the MacArthur occupation and 
the fortuitous circumstance that it was Japan’s communications (read 
“electronics”) industry that happened to benefit first from what was taught by 
the “three wise men” Americans. From the communications industry this 
knowledge of electronics, and how it could be used to improve manufacturing, 
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16)　The first industrial revolution being by the British prior to about mid-ninetieth 
century when the second, by the Americans, took place.
17)　What the authors cal “middle-up” or kacho-style since it could not be completely 
the same given the strong traditions of the Japanese culture.
soon spread to other Japanese industries. Unfortunately America, with its 
seler’s market, had no incentive to modernize in the same way after WW II and 
soon fel behind the Japanese
Towards the end of the twentieth century China successfuly enters this 
revolution. This is due to a number of things: the direct investments and 
consequent influence of Japan and Taiwan, China’s move towards economic if 
not democratic freedom, China placing more value on technology and the 
engineer than the U.S., and the rapid spread of this third revolution to al 
industries—in Japan the “revolution” was limited at first to communications— 
since Mao Tse-tung had essentialy wiped out the entire social structure leaving 
a “clean slate” upon which to build anew.
What must America do to become a “competitor” in this Third Industrial 
Revolution? This is what the authors recommend:
• Reinstitute botom-up management, perhaps with a “mixed foreman force 
consisting partly of graduates at the outset of their careers and partly of 
non-graduates at the peak of theirs” (p. 251).
• Using advanced electronics (can be taken for granted).
• In the services/public administration industries have graduates get closer 
to the gemba.18)
• And practice their 25 principles of good management (see Appendix A) 
with an emphasis on good upward communications.
That America not be left behind in this Third Industrial Revolution wil be 
critical given the need to support its aging baby boomers. Even before President 
Obama’s extravagant spending there were fears that without some significant 
change, America could even go bankrupt. Folowing the authors’ 
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18)　I take this to mean to have those people “in charge” in these industries begin seeing 
things from the way the customer is treated (at the gemba) and work to improve 
customer service.
recommendations should bring about a big increase in productivity. If this is 
“accompanied by appropriate tax increases and expenditure curbs, a solution to 
the problem wil be at hand” (p. 252).
e.　Part V: Revival
Chapter 18: The False Dawn (1996–2000). Despite signs things were geting 
beter such as the rise in the stock, bond, and property markets, and a 
remarkable rise in productivity as measured by the government,19) for most 
people their personal situation belied these positive indicators:
For the majority there was no reversal of the trend of the previous twenty-
five years. Family incomes rose only slightly; before 1970 they had grown 
by roughly 25 per cent in each decade. (p. 256)
Why this disparity between a reported rising in productivity yet no real 
improvement in living conditions? The authors fault the way productivity 
(GDP/number of hours worked) is calculated and make a good case to show that 
GDP is being overestimated while number of hours work is being 
underestimated. They recommend that when the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
publishes information about the economy they include comments about its 
limitations and also areas requiring further research.
Any growth in our economy during the “Locust Years” (1970–1995) and after 
has to be atributed to simply an increase in the size of the workforce and an 
extension of credit.20) So what is to be done to restore that “true rate of growth 
in productivity that characterized earlier ages”? The authors’ answer is: America 
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19)　The authors use figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics that show productivity 
per man-hour increasing only 1.6% in the period 1970–1995 and then 2.5% in the 
period 1996–2000.
20)　In light of what has happened after this book was published in 2007, it would 
appear there was too much “extension of credit” given the subprime problem brought 
on largely by a policy that “everyone has a right to a house.”
must regain the respect it had for technology and the technologist. That this is a 
serious problem is ilustrated by a discussion of the massive power-outage that 
occurred in the northeastern U.S. in 2003. This event highlighted the need for 
updating America’s woefuly out-of-date transmission system, which the authors 
atribute to the short-term thinking of the “so-caled” experts. In fact it is not 
only the electrical transmission system that needs updating but also the entire 
infrastructure.
A couple of other problems are also brought up in discussing this power-
outage event: an overly complex regulatory system coupled (ironicaly) with too 
much deregulation plus the lack of a coherent energy policy—obviously areas 
for which government atention is overdue.
Chapter 19: The First Light of the True Dawn (2001–2006). Ending the book 
on a somewhat bright note the authors cite these as examples that America may 
be returning to those days “Growth and Prosperity” prior to 1970:
• Although a mixed bag, thinking in the military seems to be turning 
around from the “body-count” mentality prevalent during the Vietnam 
era. People like General Colin Powel, former Secretary of Defense 
Casper Weinberger, General George W. Casey, and Col. H. R. McMaster 
are mentioned in this regard. An exception is Donald Rumsfeld21) who, 
as Secretary of Defense “..has been the public sector’s equivalent of the 
‘imperial’ chief executive, a ‘top-down’, ‘professional’ manager who 
refused to listen to his senior military advisors” (p. 264).
• Some recent (2001–2006) appointments in the corporate world also show 
promise:
° They discuss at length the changes that have taken place at General 
Electric with the appointment of Jef Immelt as chief executive. In the 
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21)　Replaced by Robert Gates in December 2006.
way of the classic GEC manger, Immelt, who spent his entire time 
with GE, has increased the number of “engineers” at the top level, has 
greatly increased the amount of research, has changed the role of the 
in-house business school to encouraging managers to get more 
“domain knowledge,” and has promoted integrated decision making.
° Another example is the appointment of A.G. Lafley as CEO of Proctor 
& Gamble.22) As opposed to his immediate predecessors, Lafley is 
“afable and consensual in his approach,” and “a person to whom it is 
easy for subordinates to give bad news” (pp. 267–268). Also, in true 
GEC tradition, he worked his way up the ladder in P&G so, like 
Immelt, realy knew the business.
° A third example is Exxon Mobile’s replacement of Lee Raymond, 
“described as ‘arrogant and high-handed’,” by Rex Tileron, “a good 
listener, noted for his diplomatic skils, as wel as a superb organizer” 
(p. 268).
• Discussing companies in general, the authors cite IBM and its move towards 
more research. Smaler companies such as Nucor Corporation (steel) and 
Emerson Electric are mentioned as “models of good governance.”
• They now mention some more indicators of a positive change: the 
railroads increasing capital expenditures, the New York Stock Exchange 
replacing Richard Grasso with John Thain (a GEC type), and the “private 
equity” trend which frees a company from the pressure of institutional 
investors to show a profit every quarter.
• Even in education the authors see improvement with adoption of stricter 
standards and the move away from so much reliance on the Scholastic 
Aptitude Test.
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22)　In June 2009 Robert McDonald took over as CEO.
• Despite recent controversies, Goldman Sachs is held up as a company 
that “appears to the authors to observe most of our Principles of Good 
Management [see Appendix A]” (p. 276).
At this point the authors digress temporarily to address the need to do 
something about “…the central problem of the American economy, namely 
Congress’ failure to exercise control over national expenditure and relate it to 
income” (p. 277). They believe that this is a job for Ben Bernanke, head of the 
Federal Reserve System, and Hank Paulson (then) Secretary of the Treasury and 
further recommend the creation of a “Fiscal Policy Commission” as has been 
suggested by others to address this critical issue. Furthermore, they endorse the 
establishment of another body that has been suggested: “an independent Asset 
Valuation Commitee… …to ofer ‘amber and red light warnings’ when price 
bubbles threaten to develop in assets such as stocks, houses, and commodities” 
(p. 278, the emphasis on “houses” added given the current subprime crisis). In 
light of the present sad state of affairs vis-à-vis the American economy, the 
authors were decidedly prescient!
The book concludes on these two points:
• Is what they’ve talked about in this chapter a valid indication that 
America is puling out of the “locust years”? Only time wil tel but 
taken together these things point to that possibility.
• But the lesson is that only by returning to the “hard grind” of practicing 
their (Appendix A) Principles of Good Management—as was done by the 
GECs—wil America be able return to those days of “Growth and 
Prosperity.”
3.　Discussion of the Book 
These are some of the ways I believe this book is remarkable and, in fact, 
unique:
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• Provides a comprehensive history of American management—both its 
development and practice.
• Provides an interesting trip through American history from a 
management perspective.
• It is wel researched.
• Provides many interesting vignetes about America.
• Chalenges conventional wisdom in many areas.
• Appears to have an overal theme of wanting to get back to those “beter 
days.”
Provides a comprehensive history of American management—both its 
development and practice. The book starts with the 1630 Great Puritan 
Migration and the very successful establishment of the Massachusets Bay 
Colony due to the company’s excelence in planning and execution and John 
Winthrop’s leadership and managerial abilities. This is folowed by other major 
contributors to the development of a good management system such as Colonel 
Lee and his Springfield Armory, Dan McCalum who reorganization of the New 
York and Erie Railroad, and Pierre du Pont who set up a modern manufacturing 
company. Underlying al these developments are the four Puritan characteristics 
cited at the beginning of this article.
At this point the culmination of these contributions are discussed at length in 
terms of characteristics of the Great Engine Companies, which produced a 
“golden age of American management” from 1920 to 1970. As a way to show 
just how wel developed and efficacious the practice of management was in 
America, its positive influence on Japan thanks to the Three Wise Men is also 
covered at length.
Then the rise of the “cult of the (so-caled) expert” is discussed to show how 
the pernicious influence of Fredrick Taylor and the rise of the business school 
and consultancy movements with al that entailed (e.g., the “professional” 
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manager and an emphasis on short-term profit) brought an end to the “golden 
age” of not only American management but also that of American society itself!
Provides an interesting trip through American history. In the course of 
providing a history of management, the book relates many interesting things 
about America history. This is just a sampling:
• A comparison of the very successful Puritan migration in 1630 to 
America with the much less successful Jamestown and Plymouth 
expeditions. One learns much about these seminal events in American 
history such as the great thought and detailed planning that characterized 
the former and, no doubt, accounted for its success.
• Some of the facts behind the gradual transformation of manufacturing 
from a “craft” industry to one of mass production. For example the role 
played by the Springfield (Massachusets) armory under the direction of 
Colonel Roswel Lee in the early 1800s.
• Many interesting details about the Great Exhibit of 1851 in London. 
Although meant to showcase British accomplishments, instead it proved 
the superiority of American manufacturing as demonstrated by such as 
Colt’s revolving pistol and McCormick’s reaper. The Great Exhibit 
represented a turning point wherein America would eventualy surpass 
Britain as a dominant world power.
• A great deal of information about the Fredrick Taylor and why he was 
anything but a “good manger.”
• The key part played by the Civil Communications Section (CCS) of 
General MacArthur’s Japanese occupation force in creating the rapid rise 
of Japanese manufacturing excelence that became a competitive threat to 
America in the 1970s.
• A great deal of information about how the “business school” movement 
started and developed in America.
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• A lot of American historical information about each of the “plums” in 
Chapter 14 (Impact of the Cult on Society): war, education, capital 
expenditure, economic policy, and medicine.
It is wel researched. I’ve never run across a book so wel researched. There 
is hardly a page that doesn’t have at least one reference on it. These are caled 
“Notes” but in fact are, almost without exception, reference citations (placed at 
the back of the book). To get an idea how many “Notes” there are, eight pages 
of them were selected at random and the notes on each page counted. These 
averaged out at 28 notes per page. Since there are about 28 pages of notes this 
brings the total to approximately 784 reference citations for a book of about 270 
pages of text!23)
There is also a six-page bibliography and a six-page name index, the later 
listing about 480 names.
It boggles the mind (at least mine) that anyone could have done so much 
research for a book of this size and makes it easier to understand its richness 
and depth.
Provides many interesting vignetes about America. Here is a sampling:
• The story on pages 60–61 of how the American locksmith Alfred C. 
Hobbs took up the chalenge of a London toolmaker, Joseph Bramah, to 
try and pick his lock. Despite many atempts no one had been able to 
pick it until Hobbs did at the Great Exhibit in London in 1851: “It took 
Hobbs fifty-one hours of work, spread over sixteen days, to discover how 
to pick the Bramah lock, after which he could open it in just twenty-five 
minutes” (p. 61).
• In discussing “botom-up” management on page 105, the fact that Peter 
Drucker, of management fame, “..objected on what he caled ‘aesthetic’ 
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23)　About 2.9 notes (references) per page of text.
grounds to the term..”
• A meeting that took place in the late 1940s with General MacArthur to 
resolve “two competing points of view”: should America give the Japanese 
as much information as possible on how to manage or would this be going 
too far and seting Japan up to be a future competitor?24) The argument for 
doing this was presented by Homer Sarasohn, one of the Three Wise Men, 
the subject of Chapter 10. The argument for giving the Japanese as much 
information as possible was it would help the nation finaly pul out of its 
economic slump and truly become a striving democracy. The alternative 
could wel be a return to the kind of dictatorial society that existed before 
the war. The result of this meeting is summed up as folows:
When the [opposing] presentations were over, [MacArthur] sat for a 
minute or so in further silence and then walked towards the door. 
Sarasohn thought to himself, “I’ve blown it.” However, just as he 
reached the exit, the general turned around, glared at Sarasohn and 
said “Go do it!” (p. 120)
• The story of a plaque at was placed at the Newport News (Virginia) 
shipyard in 1917. This plaque was featured in the instruction the Three 
Wise Men used to emphasize the importance of quality to the Japanese. 
The plaque had this simple but powerful message: “We shal build good 
ships here at a profit – if we can – at a loss if we must – but always 
good ships.” The plaque was subsequently relegated to a museum when 
the shipyard was taken over by Tenneco in 1969. This was perhaps an 
appropriate gesture by a company “..more interested in artificialy 
boosting earnings.. ..than in creating genuine wealth for its shareholders, 
its employees, and the community at large” (p. 152). However, when the 
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24)　Ironicaly this proved the case.
shipyard became a part of Northrop Grumman Newport News in 1986 
the plaque was once more given a place of place of honor in front of the 
company’s head ofice.
Chalenges conventional wisdom in many areas. For example, the idea of 
Fredrick Taylor being such a boon to management. Although his Scientific 
Management ideas are now prety much dismissed as poor management, since 
they reduced the worker to nothing more than someone to carry out 
“management’s” directions without thinking, Taylor—a poor manger himself— 
had other ideas that flew in the face of good management. For example his idea 
of breaking up the line-of-command into multiple functions.
The usual view of Dr. W. Edwards Deming’s contribution to American 
management as an unqualified success is also chalenged (in Chapter 16). 
Although he is given due credit for what he did contribute, the authors show 
why his approach failed to “rescue” American management from the state it had 
by then falen into.
The authors also chalenged several other “movements” that have come along, 
for example:
• The Human Relations movement that began with the much-balyhooed 
Hawthorne Experiments (which the authors essentialy discredit).
• The Michael Hammer and James Champy’s “Reengineering the 
Corporation” ideas.
• The Six Sigma movement.
But perhaps the biggest surprise of the book was the authors’ disdain for the 
business school movement that started with the founding of Harvard’s in 1908. 
Not only disdain but they also make a good case for showing how the business 
school as it evolved proved highly counterproductive to good management. This 
is shown to be due to its overly academic approach in producing the 
“professional manager” who, in theory, could manage any business without the 
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benefit of “domain knowledge” only atained by being with the business for a 
long time. This movement also ushered in the notion that the purpose of 
business was more to meet the expectations of institutional investors for short-
term profits versus serving the customer and promoting long-term growth.
Appears to have an overal theme of wanting to get back to those “beter 
days.” Throughout the book there is a recurring theme of how the four Puritan 
characteristics—
• A belief that life’s purpose is to establish the Kingdom of Heaven on 
Earth.
• An aptitude for mechanical skils.
• A belief that individual interests should be subordinated for the common 
good.
• An ability to marshal resources for a single purpose.
—were the bases for the once greatness of American management. A greatness 
that saw its fulest expression in the “Golden Age” of management from 1920 to 
1970 and had a great deal to do with the greatness of America itself. If America 
is to return to those days of greatness we must once again embrace the spirit of 
those Puritan principles.
I can’t help but wonder if this idea isn’t a reflection of some even wider view 
of America’s problems today, an America that seems to have lost it moral 
compass and, when it comes to fiscal responsibility, common sense. Regarding 
its moral compass we now see the deterioration of respect for traditional 
marriage, the taking of innocent unborn life now perfectly legal under Roe vs. 
Wade,25) television now often almost embarrassing to watch with it obsession 
with promiscuous sex, and rampant pornography—especialy via the Internet. 
Add to al this a growing hostility towards religion, especialy Christianity.
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25)　The Supreme Court decision in 1973 that made abortion at any stage of pregnancy 
legal.
Regarding fiscal responsibility America has lately been spending “like a 
drunken sailor” except the sailor has to quit when he runs out of money. There 
is deep concern by many Americans that this excessive spending wil someday 
be America’s Waterloo.
The loss of America’s moral compass seems closely tied to what seems to be 
a repudiation of the place God and Christianity played in the lives and 
philosophy of our founding fathers. The loss of fiscal responsibility seems 
closely tied to the abandonment of the principles of good management as 
presented in this book. I would suggest that both problems can be related to 
what the Hoppers are saying when they say we need to return to the ideals given 
to us by the Puritans.
As a final note, the book is not necessarily perfect—no work is—but 
whatever minor flaws it might have are far outweighed by its very significant 
message of a “wakeup cal” for American management and, perhaps as an 
underlying message, for American society; a message presented in highly 
readable and interesting way! I would recommend this book to anyone who’s 
interested in the history of management and what constitutes good management. 
It would also be a worthwhile read for anyone who cares about America and its 
future! 
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Appendix A (page 1 of 13)
Twenty-five Principles Underlying Good Practice 
from the Golden Age of Management 
Al with Puritan Overtones
(The Puritan Gift, pp. 280–289, used with permission)
Note 1: Folowing each principle one or two pages in The Puritan Gift are 
usualy referenced. These have been left in this appendix to show how 
each principle is backed up a related discussion in the book.
Note 2: Any citations to the literature have been omited.
SYSTEMS AND ROUTINES
PRINCIPLE ONE
Al successful organizations, however simple, consist of systems within a 
system (see page 56).
Comment
This is the Master Principle, on which al the others are a gloss. The 
organization itself is the Grand System. Once its objectives have been defined, 
the next task is to create, and to determine the objectives of, the sub-systems. 
The approach of any manager to his work has therefore to be systemic, a key 
word in any business vocabulary. (Henry Mintzberg appeared to be saying much 
the same when he told us that managerial roles colectively constitute a gestalt 
or integrated whole).
PRINCIPLE TWO
Al systems are nurtured by routines, which must be regularly reviewed and 
refreshed (see page 173).
Comment
When the principal sub-systems have been designed, the next task is to establish 
these routines and put them into effect. Routines liberate; when they are 
functioning smoothly, the manager can concentrate on those key activities that 
cannot be subjected to routine, like the design of new products or closing a 
complex deal with a customer or a supplier. If an organization fails to establish 
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good systemic routines, its employees wil sufer from burnout, since the same 
pedestrian problems wil have to be solved afresh time after time.
STRUCTURES AND HIERARCHY
PRINCIPLE THREE
The most important sub-system in any organization is the managerial 
hierarchy, which is likely to be based on some form of line-and-staff (see 
pages 49 and 50).
Comment
Hierarchies permit the systematic delegation of functions, roles and tasks. 
Delegation is not as simple a concept as it might seem at first blush. When the 
American engineer Homer Sarasohn inquired into the weaknesses of Japanese 
manufacturing in the late 1940s, he observed that, when managers delegated a 
task to a subordinate, they thought that they had also delegated the responsibility 
for it. He taught that the delegator retains that responsibility, just as if he were 
performing the task himself. Around the same time, [Wiliam] Given made a 
similar point in his folksy way: ‘Always remember, your man’s failure is your 
failure.’
Hierarchy is sometimes atacked on the grounds that it inhibits the creation of 
cross-departmental teams designed to address problems that afect more than 
one area in a firm. Anyone who propounds this view has misunderstood the way 
in which such teams come into being and function. They do not simply 
materialize out of the thin air. Someone in authority has to appoint them and 
they are efective only if they report to a person whose position in the hierarchy 
is strong enough to ensure that their recommendations are put into efect.
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Appendix A (page 2 of 13)
Twenty-five Principles Underlying Good Practice (continued)
PRINCIPLE FOUR
The best type of hierarchy is ‘botom-up’ (see pages 102 to 106).
Comment
As we explained in Chapter 9, in Great Engine companies ‘botom-up’ 
management went far beyond the simple delegation of tasks to appropriate 
levels that was (and is) a characteristic of al wel-run hierarchies. It 
superimposed an additional, informal, structure which permited de facto 
operational responsibility to be pushed down to the lowest level capable of 
accepting it – which in a manufacturing plant would be the foreman – while not 
abolishing the formal line-of-command as the ultimate channel of 
communication and control. In a crisis, or when a major change of direction was 
required, a senior manager could reassert control over a subordinate at the drop 
of a hat and without upseting the relationship.
PRINCIPLE FIVE
Leadership should as far as possible be colective or ‘colegiate’ (see page 
163).
Comment
This principle was laid down (although not in these words) by Drucker in The 
Practice of Management. He believed that by the mid-twentieth century the 
position of chief executive had become too burdensome for one man, which was 
why, in successful companies, it was being increasingly shared with others. 
There was usualy stil someone caled a chief executive oficer ‘as there is at 
General Electric’ but the job was in fact discharged by a team. This trend had 
been pushed furthest at Standard Oil of New jersey, now known as Exxon 
Mobil. At the very top of the managerial ladder were usualy to be found what 
the Japanese cal ‘two men in a box’ (see page 95).
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Appendix A (page 3 of 13)
Twenty-five Principles Underlying Good Practice (continued)
PRINCIPLE SIX
The middle manager is the keystone of the managerial arch (see page 101).
Comment
In the Golden Age of Management, first-class middle managers were important 
to companies organized both on ‘botom-up’ and on more traditional lines. This 
was for several excelent reasons. Someone had to ensure that the first-level 
managers were behaving as they should, a task far beyond the physical capacity 
of senior managers – who had other things, such as policy questions, to concern 
them. Someone had also to act as an intermediary in the exchange of 
information between top and botom. Long-serving middle managers also acted 
as the organizations ‘corporate memory’, making it unnecessary to address 
problems that had been solved before. Finaly, the middle managers as a whole 
constituted the reservoir of tested talent from which future senior executives 
could be drawn.
PRINCIPLE SEVEN
‘One man, one boss’ – which should now be re-stated as ‘one person, one 
boss' (see page 101).
Comment
Al Great Engine companies observed this rule. Only if each executive reported 
to one single person could information flow freely up and down the line-of-
command. In fact, without ‘one person, one boss’, there was (and can be) no 
proper line-of-command. A similar idea is expressed in Henri Fayol’s Principle 
5: ‘Unity of command: for any action whatsoever: an employee should receive 
orders from one supervisor only; otherwise authority, discipline, order and 
stability are threatened’. However, he failed to stress the importance of upward 
flowing information. An alternative to ‘one person, one boss’ is ‘matrix 
management’, whereby one person wil report to two bosses – for example one 
within a regional and another within a functional structure. As the management 
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Appendix A (page 4 of 13)
Twenty-five Principles Underlying Good Practice (continued)
writer, Sumantra Ghoshal has told us, an arrangement of this kind leads to 
‘conflict and confusion’.
DECISION-MAKING
PRINCIPLE EIGHT
Meetings are ‘the medium of management work’.
Comment
‘Meetings – The medium of management work’ is the title of a chapter from 
Andrew Grove’s High Output Management (see page 102). Once again, it 
would have seemed superfluous to make this point fifty years ago. However, 
Grove thought it was necessary to reassert it in 1985. There had been an assault 
by fashionable consultants on the very idea of meetings. Drucker had suggested 
(even Homer nods) that no more than 25 per cent of a manager’s time should be 
devoted to them. Less distinguished writers have proposed that they should be 
held standing up (to keep them short). Others have suggested that managers who 
had an open-door policy (presumably to encourage communication in the form 
of impromptu meetings) should sit with their backs to the door (presumably to 
avoid the same). Meetings should be as long or as short as the agenda requires 
and are best conducted siting down.
PRINCIPLE NINE
‘Integrated decision-making’ leads to right conclusions (see page 25).
Comment
It is this trait that more than any other distinguished traditional American and 
European kinds of management from each other; in Chapter 2 we commented 
that it probably existed already in the Massachusets Bay Company and went a 
long way to explaining why the initial colonization was such a success. So far 
as the authors are aware, it has never been described specificaly in print before 
or even given a name. It meant, among other things, that: (a) the implications of 
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Appendix A (page 5 of 13)
Twenty-five Principles Underlying Good Practice (continued)
any important policy were worked out in great detail before a decision was 
taken to proceed or not; (b) the same group of people was involved in al four 
phases of the managerial process: planning, decision-making, execution and 
folow-up, which were therefore to be viewed as a continuum; and (c) careful 
provision was made against the contingency that some of the original 
assumptions might be incorrect. It folowed from this Principle, as the night 
folows the day, that the makers of a decision were recognized as being 
responsible for its success or failure.
PRINCIPLE TEN
Planning should be for the short term (say, one to four years), the medium 
term (say, five to eight years) and the long term (say, nine years up) (see page 
96).
Comment
Great Engine companies felt themselves obliged to plan for the long and 
medium, as wel as the short, term because the building of a manufacturing 
plant obliged them to think at least a decade ahead. Success in achieving the 
objectives of the plan would not be measured simply in terms of the profit and 
loss account but by looking at a whole range of indicators, including rising cash 
balances and satisfying the customer.
PRINCIPLE ELEVEN
You should make a careful study of the mistakes and successes of the 
pioneers in your field – and learn from them (see page 25).
Comment
This is what Governor Winthrop and his coleagues did before seting out for 
New England in 1630. Studying other people’s successes and failures, assuming 
the information is readily available, is the cheapest form of research – indeed, it 
is beter than research since we are dealing in actual ful-scale ‘pilot’ projects 
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Twenty-five Principles Underlying Good Practice (continued)
financed and mounted at the expense of others. Great Engine companies paid 
particular atention to their competitors’ mistakes as wel as their own.
PRINCIPLE TWELVE
Excelent internal communications in al directions – but above al upwards – 
are necessary in any successful organization (see page 101).
Comment
The good American company in the mid-twentieth century was noted for the 
high quality of its information flow – communicating upwards, sideways and 
downwards within the company. The upward flow was not only the most 
important; the entire structure of the Great Engine company was geared to it.
PRINCIPLE THIRTEEN
The manager must be a leader in both a practical and a moral sense (see page 
103).
Comment
In recent decades many writers have distinguished between the roles of manager 
and leader. Leaders are characterized as charismatic figures who command 
loyalty and ofer a vision – managers as dul, gray administrators. This is a false 
apposition – to be efective, a manager must be able to lead. It is possible to 
lead without fuss.
PRINCIPLE FOURTEEN
You should use consultants sparingly – and ‘strategic’ consultants never (see 
page 158).
Comment
There are proper uses for consultants – for example, to perform one-of tasks for 
which it is inappropriate to hire permanent staff or to teach a skil that new 
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Twenty-five Principles Underlying Good Practice (continued)
circumstances require and that is not available within the existing organization. 
However, a dangerous frontier is crossed when consultants are asked to 
determine, or even discuss, what the strategy of a company should be. lf senior 
managers cannot perform that task for themselves, they should leave; that is 
why they were appointed.
PINCIPLE FIFTEEN
A manager should be aware of his responsibilities to society as a whole, 
including to his company’s employees as human beings (see page 116).
Comment
People are not commodities to be bought and sold like a pound of sugar – and 
even sugar should not to be bought and sold without serious regard for the 
people who produce and consume it. As Drucker, Given and many others have 
taught us, in everything they do, managers operate within a social context. A 
company guided by Principle Fifteen wil be reluctant to hire large numbers of 
additional staf at the beginning of a boom if there is a likelihood that they wil 
have to be laid of when the boom ends.
PRINCIPLE SIXTEEN
If it ain’t broke, you should try to make it work beter (see Deming’s famous 
14 Points on pages 242 and 243). [Note: see Appendix B]
Comment
One of the commonest remarks in the English language is: ‘if it ain’t broke, 
don’t fix it’. However, if the human race had folowed this precept since its 
ancestors materialized on earth, we would stil be living in caves, wrapped in 
animal skins. (There may be some doubt about the skins.) The huge rises in 
productivity that were a characteristic of the US economy from 1870 to 1970 
were the product of a diferent outlook, which is encapsulated in this Principle; 
it explains the reason for al the others. A passionate desire to do and make 
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Twenty-five Principles Underlying Good Practice (continued)
things beter is one of the most abiding characteristics of American society. The 
Japanese have a name for it: kaizen, or continuous improvement.
FINANCE
PRINCIPLE SEVENTEEN
Avoid debt like the plague – or, if that is impossible, use it sparingly (see 
pages 97 and 98).
Comment
One of the greatest strengths of America’s Great Engine companies in their 
Golden Age lay in their conservative (i.e. debt-free) balance sheets. This 
enabled them to ‘rol with the punches’, paying large dividends in good times 
and litle or none in bad. The assumption was that an organization should be 
designed for survival and that bad times might be just around the corner. This 
habit of mind has been carried forward, and is briliantly exemplified today, by 
Japanese companies such as Toyota Motor.
TRAINING
PRINCIPLE EIGHTEEN
A manager should possess, or acquire what is now known as ‘domain 
knowledge’ (see page 266), i.e. a profound understanding of the technology 
and business of his company, which can normaly be gained only through a 
long apprenticeship in that company or in the same industry.
Comment
The basic falacy promoted by business schools is that management as a skil 
can be learned from a theoretical point of view in an academic seting and 
thereafter exercised in any kind of organization. The corolary, also a falacy, is 
that a manager need not have a thorough understanding of his company’s 
technology. One need hardly add that, in Great Engine companies, it was taken 
for granted that every manager possessed as thorough a knowledge as possible 
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Twenty-five Principles Underlying Good Practice (continued)
of the business in which he operated.
PRINCIPLE NINETEEN
The testing and training of managers should be pragmatic and continuous (see 
pages 101 and 102).
Comment
In recent decades an entire industry has come into being with the object of 
testing applicants for managerial positions, often through ‘psychometric testing’; 
one of the objects is to identify ‘high flyers’ that is to say, people who have the 
ability to move up fast through the managerial ranks. Psychometry is an exercise 
in talent spoting. There are two problems with this approach. First, al that the 
tests demonstrate is that the person in question is good at passing tests – or has 
been lucky in the choice of questions [answers?]. Secondly, the high flyers 
selected in this way are likely to be promoted quickly into a senior position for 
which they have not been adequately prepared by a period of training in a lower 
position. There was no such concept as a ‘high flyer’ and no psychometric 
testing in the Great Engine companies of the Golden Age of Management.
PRINCIPLE TWENTY
Managers who wish to reach the top should start at or near the botom (see 
page 95).
Comment
The Great Engine companies of the mid-twentieth century were profoundly 
meritocratic in their outlook. Blue-colar workers were encouraged to beter 
themselves by taking evening classes and indeed one British visitor to the 
United States in the l950s reported that some shop-floor workers whom he met 
had qualifications equal to a university degree. However, the true meritocracy 
existed among graduates. They were expected to start at the botom, often as 
foremen mixing with the non-graduate foremen, and then work their way 
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Twenty-five Principles Underlying Good Practice (continued)
towards the top. Only in this way could they acquire the thorough familiarity 
with the business that was required if they were to occupy the highest positions.
PRINCIPLE TWENTY-ONE
Job rotation (sometimes known as intra-company mobility) is desirable to 
create the ‘rounded’ executive (see page 163).
Comment
This Principle is tied in closely with the previous one since, in order to acquire 
an acquaintance with al or most of the activities of his company, the rising 
executive had to pass through al or most of its departments. (The blinkered 
specialist had no place in the organization – at least not if he wanted to rise and 
perhaps even if he wanted to stay where he was.) That this was normal practice 
in Great Engine companies around 1950 is evidenced in Drucker’s writings. 
Speaking of ‘a large electrical manufacturer’ (probably General Electric), he 
tels us that: ‘Men in the promotable group wil be rotated into special jobs in 
functions they are not familiar with, each job assignment to last six months to 
two years.
EMPLOYMENT
PRINCIPLE TWENTY-TWO
Employment should in general be for the long term – by which is meant, at 
least, eight and, if possible, ten years (see page 161).
Comment
One of the reasons why this was important is that it took a long time for a new 
manager to build up a suficient knowledge of his company’s business for him 
to be able to play a useful role. Another was that the expense of training could 
not be justified if he was expected to leave within a short period of time. Yet a 
third was that only in this way could the company have got to know an 
employee wel enough to decide whether he was suitable for promotion.
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Twenty-five Principles Underlying Good Practice (continued)
PRINCIPLE TWENTY-THREE
Complementarity is one of the keys to making appointments (see page 25).
Comment
In some other world beyond our ken there may have been a class of perfectly 
‘rounded’ super-mangers, each suficient unto himself for al the tasks he was 
caled upon to undertake. In Great Engine companies of the mid-twentieth 
century, whilst every efort was made to create a fuly ‘rounded’ executive by 
job rotation and other methods, the outcome would nearly always have been less 
than perfect. Each manager had his strengths and his weaknesses. Hence the 
doctrine of complimentarity. This meant, among other things, building teams. 
Thus if a chief executive was strong on engineering but weak on finance, he 
would be expected to appoint a strong financial director – and if he did not, his 
Board might insist on one. Unless a manager acknowledged his weaknesses, 
nothing much could have been done about them.
PRINCIPLE TWENTY-FOUR
The remuneration system should promote and reward group efort (see page 
237).
Comment
The management literature of the Golden Age was generaly unhelpful on this 
subject. lf you read parts of Sloan’s My Years with General Motors or Drucker’s 
The Practice of Management superficialy, you wil obtain the impression that 
their authors were as wedded to the idea of bonuses and stock option plans as 
any high-flying corporate executive of the 1990s. In fact, bonuses and stock 
options formed a relatively smal percentage of total remuneration in most 
companies at that time. A beter view of mid-twentieth-century habits is to be 
found in an opinion Drucker atributed to the research department of an 
unnamed bank:
lf the top executive in a company gets a salary several times as large as the 
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Twenty-five Principles Underlying Good Practice (continued)
salaries paid to the Number Two, Three and Four men, you can be prety sure 
that the firm is badly managed. But if the salary levels of the four or five men 
at the head of the ladder are al close together, then the performance and 
morale of the entire management group is likely to be high.
Incentive systems that over-reward senior executives have no place in any 
company that practices colegiate decision-making – and/or ‘botom-up’ 
management; where much of real responsibility is passed down the line, so 
should much of the reward.
PRINCIPLE TWENTY-FIVE
Avoid ostentation like the plague (see page 98).
Comment
The good manager of the period was aware that any success he achieved was 
due to his entire team. He behaved unostentatiously, remembering that he was 
simply the first among equals. David Farr is chief executive of Emerson 
Electric, a company which has observed Golden Age principles right down to 
the present day; he tels us (see page 271) that ‘people may cal us boring – but 
if we are, boring is OK’. 
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Appendix B (page 1 of 2)
Deming’s Fourteen Points
(The Puritan Gift, pp. 242–243)
Deming’s Famous 14 Points
1 Create constancy of purpose toward improvement of product and service, 
with the aim to become competitive and to stay in business, and to provide 
jobs.
2 Adopt the new philosophy. We are in a new economic age. Western 
management must awaken to the chalenge, must learn their 
responsibilities, and take on leadership for change.
3 Cease dependence on inspection to achieve quality. Eliminate the need for 
inspection on a mass basis by building quality into the product in the first 
place.
4 End the practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag. Instead, 
minimize total cost. Move toward a single supplier for any one item, on a 
long-term relationship of loyalty and trust.
5 Improve constantly and forever the system of production and service, to 
improve quality and productivity, and thus constantly decrease costs.
6 Institute training on the job.
7 Institute leadership. The aim of supervision should be to help people and 
machines and gadgets to do a beter job. Supervision of management is in 
need of overhaul as wel as supervision of production workers.
8 Drive out fear, so that everyone may work efectively for the company.
9 Break down barriers between departments. People in research, design, 
sales, and production must work as a team, to foresee problems of 
production and in use that may be encountered with the product or service.
10 Eliminate slogans, exhortations, and targets for the workforce asking for 
zero defects and new levels of productivity. Such exhortations only create 
adversarial relationships, as the bulk of the causes of low quality and low 
productivity belong to the system and thus lie beyond the power of the 
workforce. 
─ ─205
Robert B. Austenfeld, Jr.:　The Puritan Gift—A Summary and Discussion of a
Remarkable Book
11a Eliminate work standards (quotas) on the factory floor. Substitute 
leadership.
11b Eliminate management by objective. Eliminate management by numbers, 
numerical goals. Substitute leadership.
12a Remove barriers that rob the hourly worker of his right to pride of 
workmanship. The responsibility of supervisors must be changed from 
sheer numbers to quality.
12b Remove barriers that rob people in management and in engineering of 
their right to pride of workmanship. This means, inter alia, abolishment of 
the annual merit rating and of management by objective.
13 Institute a vigorous program of education and self-improvement.
14 Put everybody in the company to work to accomplish the transformation. 
The transformation is everybody’s job.
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Deming’s Fourteen Points (continued)
